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Policy communities, devolution and policy transfer:
The case of alcohol pricing in Wales
Matthew Lesch and Jim McCambridge
Department of Health Sciences, Mental Health and Addiction Research Group, University of
York, York, UK
ABSTRACT
This study investigates how processes of horizontal policy transfer can unfold in
the context of devolution, examining the development of legislation on
minimum unit pricing (MUP) in Wales, following on from Scotland’s earlier
policy decision. The study draws on a range of sources, including primary
documents, media coverage, and interviews with policy participants. Our
analysis identifies the importance of the specific character of Welsh political
institutions, particularly the emphasis given to participation and consultation
in policymaking. In the case of MUP, we document a process of policy-
oriented learning, where policymakers made a concerted effort to draw on
an assortment of expertise and experiences, including but not limited to the
Scottish model. We also find that the Welsh public health policy community
was well placed to support the framing of MUP and to address limitations in
policy capacity. The findings hold implications for future studies of learning,
devolution, and alcohol policy more generally.
KEYWORDS Policy transfer; devolution; policy learning; multi-level governance; alcohol policy;
institutional analysis
In recent years, evidence-informed national alcohol policy agendas have pro-
liferated across the globe (Babor et al. 2010). Alcohol poses a difficult set of
policy challenges for society. Just like tobacco, alcohol is highly addictive
(McCambridge and Morris 2019). Alcohol has negative consequences, includ-
ing for physical and mental health and welfare, for individuals, populations
and society. The more alcohol is consumed, the more harm can be expected;
this relationship is observed across populations and for a wide range of
health- and non-health-related harms (Babor et al. 2010). The policies
which are most effective in reducing alcohol-related harms rely on restricting
alcohol’s affordability, accessibility, and promotion. In response, some
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governments have turned to pricing mechanisms, including minimum unit
pricing (MUP). MUP imposes a floor price for a standardized dose of
alcohol and is designed to discourage the consumption of high-strength,
cheap alcohol (Stockwell et al. 2012).
There have been different experiences of alcohol pricing reforms across
the UK context. The Scottish government first discussed alcohol pricing in
2008 and enacted legislation for MUP in 2012 (McCambridge, Hawkins, and
Holden 2013). MUP has since been debated across UK legislatures. In 2012,
the UK government announced its intention to implement MUP but then
reversed these plans in the face of industry pressure (Godlee 2013; Gornall
2014). In 2017, the Welsh parliament adopted MUP. MUP legislation took
effect in Scotland in May 2018, after delays from legal challenges by the
Scotch Whisky Association (SWA), and in Wales in March 2020. In Northern
Ireland, support for MUP has been expressed by the government but a
lengthy suspension of devolved government, and other policy priorities
have slowed progress.
The UK is commonly regarded as a “quasi-federal” political system, with
elected assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland holding constitu-
tionally entrenched powers over key portfolios including health and edu-
cation (Bogdanor 2003; Gamble 2006). Studies of the policymaking context
in the UK post-devolution have tended to focus on Scotland (e.g. Keating
et al. 2003; Mooney and Scott 2005; Keating and Stevenson 2006; Cairney
2007; Cairney 2009b; Keating 2010). Less attention has been paid to under-
standing the policy process in Wales (but see McAllister 2000; Wincott
2005; Royles 2006; Andrews and Martin 2010; Nutley et al. 2012; Royles and
McEwen 2015; Chaney, Sophocleous, and Wincott 2020; Lesch and McCam-
bridge 2020) and Northern Ireland (but see Meehan 2012; Birrell 2012).
Research on devolution and its policy implications likely reflects a broader
interest in multi-level governance (Bache and Flinders 2004). With authority
dispersed to a multiplicity of institutions and actors, scholars have examined
processes at the supra-national, regional, and local level (Hooghe and Marks
2003, 2004; Cairney 2012). From this perspective, devolution introduces
several competing dynamics. Dispersing legislative authority can enable
devolved territories to design policies so that they are better aligned with
the preferences and values of local communities (Hooghe and Marks 2004).
By the same token, devolution can induce competition between govern-
ments, leading to policy innovations, and in some cases policy transfer or con-
vergence (Cairney 2007, 2009b).
Interdependence, policy convergence and policy transfer have been major
themes of recent research on multi-level governance and devolution.
Researchers distinguish vertical (from national to sub-national level) and hori-
zontal (sub-national to sub-national) variants of policy transfer within feder-
ated polities (Evans and Davies 1999; Benson and Jordan 2011). In the UK,
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Keating and his colleagues (2012) identify three potential pathways: (1)
centre to the periphery, (2) periphery to the centre, and (3) across the periph-
ery. The first category is identified as the most common in the UK, largely
reflecting Whitehall’s larger size and stronger policy capacity. Horizontal
transfer, the third category, has also been observed but is less clearly under-
stood. Notable examples include the elimination of NHS prescription charges
and the creation of commissioners for children and the elderly. Whilst these
are commonly cited as illustrations of horizontal transfer in the UK (Williams
2005, 2014; Harker 2012), the processes underlying these policy innovations
and subsequent transfers have not been systematically examined.
In this article, we seek to contribute to the literature on devolution and
horizontal transfer, with a focus on MUP in Wales. This case study is used to
better understand how policy ideas may move between jurisdictions, and
how this process is shaped by institutional conditions. We argue that whilst
policy transfer (from Scotland) is helpful for understanding the origins of
MUP in Wales, policy decision-making involved much more than copying or
emulation. To explain policy development in Wales, we draw particularly on
what Evans (2009) calls hybridization, a type of policy-oriented learning
where a policy decision is modelled after a particular example but is also
informed by other experiences and insights. We also point towards the role
of policy communities as idea carriers, as well as broader developments in
the UK and Scotland in shaping the policy decision-making process in Wales.
Our findings hold important implications for research on devolution,
policy communities and policymaking in low-capacity settings (Keating,
Cairney, and Hepburn 2009; Connell, Martin, and St Denny 2017, 2019).
Legal authority, organizational resources and fiscal capacity are commonly
identified as key measures of policy capacity (Hood and Margetts 2007; Oster-
katz et al. 2016). Low policy capacity within devolved territories is usually
regarded as a constraint (Osterkatz et al. 2016; Cole et al. 2021). Our
findings additionally suggest that these institutional conditions do not
necessarily impede policy innovation and/or policy-oriented learning. Con-
sistent with research in other policy sectors (Connell, Martin, and St Denny
2017), we find that the convening power of the Welsh government
enabled policymakers to draw on the knowledge of experts and local stake-
holder groups. Our findings suggest that the specific character of Welsh pol-
itical development, particularly its emphasis on participation and
consultation in policymaking (Tewdwr-Jones 2001; Chaney and Fevre 2001),
made policy learning possible in this particular lower capacity environment.
The article draws on a range of sources, including primary documents,
newspaper articles, and interviews with policy participants, including health
officials, civil society actors, elected officials, journalists, and public health
experts. Fourteen semi-structured interviews were conducted by the first
author in March and April 2019. Interviewees were recruited by e-mail with
REGIONAL & FEDERAL STUDIES 3
a response rate of ∼30%, following scoping of the key actors using documen-
tary data sources. Ethics approval for data collection was obtained through
the Research Governance Committee at the University York in February
2019. The interviews were transcribed, then thematically coded by ML, with
JM supporting the analysis and successive drafts of the findings. The nature
of this research design meant that our analysis and conclusions are based
on informed interviewees’ perceptions and recollections of policy develop-
ments. Accordingly, we have triangulated interview data with government
documents and other newspaper coverage in generating key inferences.
In the next section, we bring together literature on policy transfer, political
institutions, and devolution in the UK to form the conceptual basis for the
empirical analysis. In the third section, we analyse the case study, incorporat-
ing a theoretical discussion. The final section reflects on the implications of
the findings for future research.
Theoretical framework
Policy transfer, political institutions, and policy communities
The concept of policy transfer has a rich history in the study of public policy
(for review, see Benson and Jordan 2011). Policy transfer studies explore the
“process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements,
institutions, and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in
the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and
ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 7).
A continuum of policy transfer processes has been proposed. Building on
Dolowitz and Marsh’s (2000) seminal framework, Evans (2009) identifies four
types of policy-oriented learning processes: copying, emulation, hybridiz-
ation, and inspiration. These processes can be distinguished by the extent
to which transferred policies deviate from their originals. In instances of
copying, there is no deviation from the original; policy designs are simply
copied and pasted. In emulation processes, policies deviate slightly, reflecting
minor changes to the policy design. Hybridization describes a more labour-
intensive process. Here, policymakers fuse a range of insights from
different empirical settings to formulate a policy that partly resembles the
original. Finally, inspiration is where an original policy inspires a government
to act but results in a completely distinct policy response. The search for infor-
mation in the latter two processes is much more resource-intensive. These
transfer mechanisms are akin to social learning (Hall 1993) or epistemic learn-
ing (Dunlop and Radaelli 2018), where policymakers, experts, and stake-
holders collectively puzzle over problems and solutions.
Policymaking institutions may bemore or less open to policy transfer. Insti-
tutionalist scholarship stresses the impact of formal rules, norms, and
4 M. LESCH AND J. MCCAMBRIDGE
historical legacies on political behaviours (Hall and Taylor 1996). Institutions
matter for policy, including policy transfer, because these determine where
decision-making power is located and circumscribes how it is exercised
(Thelen 1999). As Lodge (2003, 163) explains, institutional rules “allocate
the roles and responsibilities” and thus “shape [actors’] access and veto
power.” Institutional parameters are not necessarily fixed. Changes to political
institutions have implications for policy transfer.
Devolution creates new political institutions. One potential consequence
of devolution is that it can induce venue-shopping by interest groups
(Pralle 2003; Cairney 2007). Politically astute policy communities can adapt
to the shifting location of decision-making power by organizing their
efforts at multiple levels (i.e. federating their structures) and/or focusing
their efforts on one institutional venue, deemed more sympathetic to its
interests or ideas. Keating, Cairney, and Hepburn (2009) find evidence of
the latter in the UK, some policy communities have shifted their attention
to the devolved governments (though this varies across policy sectors). In
the Welsh health sector, they describe a “distinct policy community”, compris-
ing health professionals and local organizations keen to advance a “broad
public health agenda” (8). Policy communities, or advocacy coalitions (Saba-
tier 1988), comprise the collection of experts, officials, and advocates that
operate in the same policy space. Individuals operating within such commu-
nities are bound by a set of shared beliefs, including problem-definitions and
policy preferences about solutions (Miller et al. 2011).
Devolution holds potentially profound implications for policy transfer.
Creating new sites of policymaking generates opportunities for lesson-
drawing (Rose 1991). Policy communities may be well-positioned to facilitate
this process, as policy actors are often linked to broader policy communities
operating at the regional, national and international level. According to Stone
(2004, 550), “the agents of lesson-drawing and policy transfer” tend to be
“individuals, networks and organizations.” Policy communities are thus
likely important in the policy transfer given their access to and knowledge
of a wide range of policy contexts.
The devolved policymaking context in Wales
Understanding the institutional context in which policymaking unfolds is
critical for parsing potential drivers of policy change. Devolution has incre-
mentally led to institutional change in Wales. The first devolved institutions
were created with the Government of Wales Act 1998. Since then, the govern-
ment’s powers have slowly expanded. Initially, the Welsh parliament could
only table secondary legislation but following a referendum, it gained
primary law-making authority in 2011 (Mitchell 2013; Cole and Strafford
2014). Finally, under the Wales Act 2017, the Welsh parliament moved to a
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reserved powers model (akin to Scotland), meaning it could legislate on all
matters not explicitly reserved to Westminster (e.g. defense, public order,
monetary policy).
Both the novelty and incrementalismof devolution have had consequences
for policy capacity in Wales. Policy capacity refers to a government’s ability to
“review, formulate and implement policies within its jurisdiction” but varies
depending on the “quality of resources available” to officials (Fellegi 1996,
cited in Wellstead and Stedman 2011, p. 462). In the UK, Whitehall is a highly
specialized, well-resourced, and experienced bureaucracy, whilst the devolved
administrations are less equipped for policy development and evaluation
(Cole, Jones, and Storer 2003; Keating, Cairney, and Hepburn 2009; Cole
2013). Furthermore, there are key differences across the devolved territories.
The Scottish bureaucracy is larger than the Welsh one, and the Scottish parlia-
ment was initially afforded much greater legislative power (Cole, Jones, and
Storer 2003; Cole and Strafford 2014). Royles (2006, 147) describes how the
Welsh government experienced “capacity problems” in its early years, citing
“inadequate staffing and limited policy development capabilities.” This charac-
terization reflects a broader legacy of asymmetry. Before devolution, theWelsh
Office (a branch of the UK Government) largely implemented UK legislation. In
contrast, the Scottish Office was more autonomous and thus more experi-
enced in policy development (Jeffery 2006; Royles 2006; McAllister 2000).
From a policy transfer perspective, then, one might anticipate limited
policy innovation in Wales, and even a greater likelihood of copying or emu-
lation by the Welsh government. Yet existing research points in the opposite
direction. According to one account, Wales has “managed to develop a highly
distinct policy agenda in the key areas of health and education” (Bradbury
and Mitchell 2005, 301). Innovation has continued over the past decade,
most notably with the passage of the Well-being of Future Generations
(Wales) Act 2015 (Nesom and MacKillop 2020).
Understanding the inclusion of civil society actors in policy development
may help explain how policy innovation is possible in a low-policy capacity
environment. Scholars analysing Wales have described it as “more consen-
sual” than Westminster, stressing the “systematic inclusion of pressure partici-
pants” in policy development (Cairney 2009a, 361; Entwistle 2006; Chaney
and Wincott 2014). The “Welsh Way” describes a consultative approach to
policymaking and reflects its small size and the importance of personal
relationships between civil society groups and government officials
(Keating, Cairney, and Hepburn 2009; Cairney 2008). As Royles and McEwen
(2015, 1037) explain:
[S]ub-state governments can overcome limitations of their formal constitutional
power… by nurturing and accessing policy networks and expertise to
strengthen their policy development.
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More recent research has clarified the conditions in which policy commu-
nities can promote policy development in low-capacity settings. Connell
and his colleagues (2017) use the NATO – Nodality, Authority, Treasure and
Organisation – typology of policy tools to emphasize the importance of nod-
ality in Wales. Nodality describes “the property of being in the middle of an
information or social network” (44). In the case of homelessness policy,
they show how the presence of a dense policy network has been vital for
mobilizing policy-relevant knowledge, despite the government’s limited in-
house research capacity. This suggests that policy communities may be
well-positioned in Wales to frame policy debates and offer expertise to a gov-
ernment whose resources are more limited. Yet, it might also be the case that
civil society groups, including experts, are consulted but their capacity for
influence might be limited. Determining whether policy communities can
influence decision-making is an empirical question and thus must be
assessed across each sector and/or policy issue accordingly.
Case study
Background
The Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill was introduced
into the Welsh parliament in October 2017 and passed into law in June
2018. The policy, which took effect in March 2020, imposes restrictions on
the sale of alcohol, making it illegal to sell a unit of alcohol below 50 pence.
Alcohol has been a long-standing public health concern in Wales. Wales
has seen a steady increase in alcohol-related deaths and hospital admissions
in the last 40 years. Alcohol is estimated to cost the government about £76.5
million per annum (Government of Wales 2017). Inexpensive alcohol has
been identified as a key driver of consumption and harm. The Welsh experi-
ence is consistent with international evidence which has linked harmful levels
of drinking to cheap alcohol (Stockwell et al. 2012). As one Welsh politician
noted, access to “cheap and strong cider and beer” has made “hazardous
and dangerous drinking” much more widespread in Wales.1
Interest in alcohol pricing policy prompted several commissioned studies
across the UK in the late 2000s. In 2008, the UK Department of Health had
experts at the University of Sheffield model different price-based policy inter-
ventions (Hawkins andMcCambridge 2019). Subsequentwork on the Sheffield
Alcohol Policy Model demonstrated the potential impact of introducing MUP
in Scotland (Purshouse et al. 2009) and England (Purshouse et al. 2010).
Devolution, alcohol policy and the UK context
Alcohol policy in Wales is shaped by devolution. Taxation is not a devolved
power and so the ability of the Welsh (and Scottish) governments to
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influence alcohol prices is circumscribed by the constitution. Since taxes
could not be raised by the government, “[Wales had] to look to other
levers, including minimum unit pricing”.2 In 2009, with alcohol-related
deaths on the rise, the Welsh government pressed Westminster to increase
taxes on alcohol (Hutchinson 2009). In 2012, the UK government announced
it would adopt MUP for England and Wales but then reversed course a year
later.
Alcohol policy in Wales is further shaped by the UK’s asymmetrical
approach to devolution, reflecting the 1997 referenda results in Scotland
and Wales on whether devolution should occur at all. Unlike Scotland
where approximately three-quarters of voters supported devolution, in
Wales, the result was a very narrow majority, and the parliament did not func-
tion as a primary law-making body until 2011 (Cole and Strafford 2014).
Uncertainty over whether the parliament possessed the legal authority to
adopt minimum pricing for alcohol complicated the policy process. Under
devolution, the Welsh parliament’s powers to legislate on alcohol were
“somewhat ambiguous”.3 Between 2014 and 2015, the Welsh government
contemplated adopting its own MUP but faced pushback from UK-level
officials. In 2016, several MPs questioned the Welsh parliament’s authority
to legislate an MUP. The Welsh Secretary (UK Government cabinet member
responsible for Wales) told a reporter that because “alcohol is so associated
with criminal justice”, alcohol pricing should be considered as a UK-level
responsibility (BBC News 2016). In contrast, Welsh government officials main-
tained they possessed legislative competence, specifically under the Govern-
ment of Wales Act 2006, which granted authority over the “[p]romotion of
public health” (Government of Wales 2017).
Further complicating the matter were evolving changes to the Welsh gov-
ernment’s powers. As noted above, in 2017, Wales moved to a reserved
powers model, meaning specific powers would be reserved for Westminster
(most importantly here including alcohol pricing). For proponents of MUP,
these macro constitutional changes posed a major threat to the prospect
of policy change in Wales.4 Yet some public health experts and government
lawyers also saw the impending change as a potential opportunity for action.
The provisions of the Wales Act did not take effect immediately and so this
provided a fleeting “window of opportunity” to introduce enabling legislation
(Livingston et al. 2020, 2). Despite the potential risk of a legal challenge by the
UK government, the Welsh government followed this advice and introduced
the legislation.
A second complicating factor was the legal challenge to the Scottish law
by alcohol producers. The SWA claimed the measure infringed both UK legis-
lation and the EU’s single market law (Hawkins and McCambridge 2020b).
Had the courts accepted the SWA’s argument, MUP would be unlawful in
Wales as well. Ultimately, both European and UK courts rejected the
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alcohol industry’s argument, deeming MUP as a justifiable use of public
health legislation. The final ruling, however, was not made until November
2017, leaving Welsh actors to operate in a context of considerable uncer-
tainty. The court challenge received considerable attention in the Welsh
press (Rutherford 2015; Smith 2017, 2018) and was identified by every inter-
viewee as a salient issue (see below). Critically the Welsh parliament passed
MUP legislation some weeks ahead of the final court ruling in Scotland (see
Table 1). This indicates that whilst Welsh policymakers were mindful of the
uncertainties about the direction of the court’s ruling, they were not dis-
suaded by it from progressing the legislation.
Scotland, MUP, and agenda-setting
Interviewees stressed the range of evidentiary sources that were part of the
decision-making process to ultimately adopt MUP in Wales. As one advocate
explained, the Scottish legislative debate over MUP played an agenda-setting
function, as the initial debates over the bill in the early 2010s were “closely
followed by public health advocates in Wales.”5 One public health expert
recalled having discussions with civil servants about MUP while it was
being debated in Scotland:
I remember when I was putting together our public health report in 2012, I had
discussions with some of the civil servants in Welsh government and they said,
‘we know, [MUP] is on our radar.’ [Wales] is pretty good at looking either across
the UK or internationally about what’s going on and [they] were very aware of
what was happening in Scotland.6
Another interviewee explained how this reflected a broader pattern in Welsh
politics:
Table 1. UK MUP-related timelines of events.
Date Event
June 2008 Scottish government announces plan to adopt of MUP
March 2012 UK government announces MUP will be part of a new alcohol strategy
June 2012 The Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 is adopted by Scottish parliament
July 2012 Scottish Whisky Association (SWA) challenges legal basis of Scottish MUP
July 2013 UK government backtracks on plan to adopt MUP
April 2014 Welsh government announces interest in MUP as part of its Public Health (Wales) Bill
July 2015 Welsh government separates MUP from the Public Health (Wales) Bill and issues draft
Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Bill
September
2016
The Welsh Secretary (UK) argues alcohol pricing is not a devolved matter




The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom rejects SWA’s legal challenge, upholding
MUP legislation in the UK
August 2018 Welsh parliament enacts Public Health (Minimum Price for Alcohol) (Wales) Act 2018.
May 2018 Scottish MUP is implemented
March 2020 Wales MUP is implemented
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Wales is a small country, it has limited [policy] infrastructure… Scotland is much
bigger so often [the Scottish government] will [take] the lead on a number of
policy areas and Wales will [follow] quite closely behind.7
Among some interviewees, there was reluctance, however, to describe the
Scottish legislation as the inspiration for Wales. As one government official
explained:
Obviously, the fact that the legislation being taken forward in Scotland was a
factor… but I think probably both countries were exploring similar issues,
just in terms of levels of consumption, things like alcohol-related deaths
[and] hospital admissions.8
According to one politician, MUP discussions between the two governments
were actually quite minimal. As they explained:
[The Welsh and Scottish] governments are [just] beginning to talk to one
another [about MUP now]…When we implement it [we’ll talk through] all
the hiccups and stuff but this was less so around the specific decision [to
adopt MUP].9
The most salient piece of information for Welsh policymakers seemed to be
the legal challenge to the Scottish legislation. As one politician recalled:
I certainly remember discussions that we had during the deliberations of the
bill…wanting to wait and see how it works in Scotland before [MUP was] actu-
ally implemented in Wales. But the main point of interest was also whether the
Scottish government was [legally] allowed to do it.10
These characterizations are consistent with evidence from primary docu-
ments. In the Welsh government’s explanatory memorandum on MUP, Scot-
land, Canada, Ireland and Northern Ireland’s experiences with alcohol pricing
legislation are all described but no special prominence is given to Scotland
(Government of Wales 2017). One factor that likely constrained capacity for
learning from Scotland was the legal challenge, which prevented implemen-
tation, and by extension, evaluation.
The design of MUP in Wales is remarkably similar to Scotland’s policy. In
both jurisdictions, the minimum price is set at 50 pence per unit of alcohol.
Furthermore, both are subject to 5-year sunset clauses, requiring govern-
ments to reauthorize the legislation following evaluation of impacts. There
are some marginal differences in the operation of the two policies. The Scot-
tish legislation includes broader restrictions on alcohol retail promotions
(Livingston et al. 2020) and the enforcement protocols vary in each country
(Government of Scotland 2018, 2020). The overall similarities in approaches
to alcohol pricing, however, would seem to suggest that Wales copied Scot-
land. Yet as the subsequent discussion illustrates, the transfer process was far
more complicated, revealing how a range of actors and the institutional
context promoted hybridization.
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The public health policy community and hybridization
Interview data illustrate the central role of the public health community in
fostering policy change. The Welsh government first gave serious consider-
ation to MUP in 2014. During early discussions about a wide-ranging
Public Health Bill, public health advocates identified access to cheap
alcohol as a pressing issue and cited the Scottish policy as a potential
model.11
Between 2014 and 2017, the Welsh government examined the merits of a
new policy on alcohol pricing. In 2014, the government had tasked an exter-
nal Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse (APoSM) with reviewing the inter-
national evidence on MUP as well as other policy measures. The bulk of
the evidence came from modelling data and international research on
pricing. The panel examined the Scottish decision as well as price floors for
alcohol in Saskatchewan and British Columbia.12 Panelists used their contacts
from the Scottish public health community to help interpret the evidence.13
Using data from Public Health Wales, the panel also studied the magnitude of
alcohol-related harms in Wales. In its final report, the panel urged the govern-
ment to follow Scotland’s lead on MUP (Advisory Panel on Substance Misuse
2014). According to one health official, the legal uncertainty, coupled with
potential objections from Westminster, led the government to remove
MUP from its initial 2015 Public Health bill and make the legislation a standa-
lone bill.14
Public health had been a devolved power in Wales since the creation of
the Welsh parliament. Welsh advocates with a keen interest in advancing
population-level policies thus focused their efforts at this level of governance.
The emphasis placed in the Welsh parliament on stakeholder engagement
(Keating, Cairney, and Hepburn 2009; Chaney and Fevre 2001) has enabled
these actors to form relationships with civil servants and politicians. As one
advocate explained:
We’re close to the Welsh government and that can be a help or a hindrance…
But when you’re all on the same page and you’ve all got a will to make things
happen you can get some of the change that you need. That’s one of the
aspects which has led to the positive work on minimum unit price in Wales.15
The early framing of alcohol as a public health issue had important conse-
quences, placing the public health community as a key authority on the
bill. Alcohol pricing policy was relatively new terrain for the Welsh govern-
ment, leaving advocates in a “strong position to influence civil servants
and ministers.”16 As one advocate recalled:
The Welsh government [didn’t] have a huge amount of capacity to understand
alcohol policy in-house. A lot of that [work] was farmed out to Alcohol Concern
Wales, [a leading alcohol advocacy group in Wales] and other expert groups.17
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In April 2014, whilst APoSM’s evidence review was being undertaken a Public
Health White Paper was released. TheWhite Paper described MUP as a “public
health”measure that could help reduce alcohol-related harm (Government of
Wales 2014, 31). Framing MUP as a public health measure may have been
strategic on the government’s part. Yet, as one advocate explained, the gov-
ernment’s framing likely reflected a genuine concern about alcohol and
public health:
I think the Welsh government and their medical advisers have been very keen
to see [alcohol] as a public health issue, and I think they do the same with illegal
drugs as well.18
The public health community was not restricted to public health experts in
Wales. In 2014, the Welsh government commissioned the Sheffield research-
ers to model the impact of different minimum prices (Government of Wales
2014). As another health official recalled:
We’d seen the modelling work that they had done both for England and Scot-
land… so we had an iteration of the model in 2014 and then we updated that
in 2017… Because [MUP] hadn’t been implemented anywhere there [wasn’t]
evaluation evidence that we [could] rely on. The best we have at this point is
the modelled evidence.19
According to the modelling, illness, crime and workplace absenteeism could
be significantly reduced with a 50-pence minimum price (Meng et al. 2014).
The Sheffield Model thus enhanced the attractiveness of this particular policy
measure for a government with limited policy capacity. As another health
official explained:
I think the fact that we did have a model that had used data specifically for
Wales was a strength… Sometimes we don’t always have the data and the evi-
dence at the Wales level, so you’re trying to generalise from evidence in other
jurisdictions, other countries, and possibly other cultures sometimes as well.
Whereas at least with modelling… as much of the data as possible was
Wales-based data.20
As one advocate explained, the Sheffield research was attractive because it
presented decision-makers with a clear policy solution:
From a policy study perspective, it was like, this is the problem and [MUP] is
the solution. This is how you introduce the solution and this is what the sol-
ution will produce. It was all there on five slides that could you get from [the
Sheffield Alcohol Group website] or via any number of conference report
presentations.21
There were also close ties between the Welsh public health community, UK
public health groups, and experts, including the Sheffield researchers. Inter-
viewees identified key umbrella organizations, including the UK-based
Alcohol Health Alliance which could “point interested parties to ready-
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made solutions around pricing, availability and marketing.”22 One advocate
stressed the density of the alcohol policy network:
[Welsh health officials] had no lack of opportunity to go to conferences and
meetings where people would present on [MUP]… It would have been
almost impossible for someone working with that alcohol brief to not have
MUP somewhere near the top of their inbox. MUP was almost the only thing
people were talking about for two years.23
Consultations provided another key opportunity for public health advocates
to frame key issues for policymakers. The Welsh government undertook
several consultations with stakeholders: first in 2014 following its proposal
to adopt MUP, second, between July and December 2015 to discuss
design, and finally in 2018 after the passage of the legislation to consult on
pricing level. At each point, public health advocates and organizations,
including Alcohol Concern Cymru/Wales, Alcohol Health Alliance UK, the
Association of Directors of Public Health, and several prominent medic organ-
izations, used these opportunities to marshal evidence in favour of MUP.
In October 2017, the government referred the bill to the Health, Social
Care, and Sport Committee to provide greater scrutiny and further consul-
tation. Written responses and oral evidence came disproportionately from
public health advocates and their allies, including the Sheffield researchers,
Public Health Wales, and the Welsh NHS Confederation. Testimony included
references to Scotland’s decision, discussions of the Sheffield model, and
health-related outcomes in Canadian provinces with a price floor. In its
final report, the committee supported the government’s approach, citing
the testimony of public health experts, as well as offered some amendments
for strengthening parts of the legislation (National Assembly for Wales 2018).
Thus the committee proceedings provided another key opportunity for the
public health policy community to brief legislators on the evidence base
for MUP.
The role of opponents in the policy process
The deep involvement of public health advocates in the policy process con-
trasts significantly with that of the alcohol industry. Although policymakers
anticipated resistance, interview data and media coverage between 2014
and 2017 suggest industry opposition was relatively muted. Numerous UK-
level alcohol industry groups voiced objections to the bill during the commit-
tee’s scrutiny work (National Assembly for Wales 2018). Compared to Scot-
land and England, however, the alcohol industry was much less prominent
in the process. As one politician remarked: “For whatever reason, [the
alcohol industry] didn’t engage so much with us.”24 This appears consistent
with research on organized interests in Wales, which suggests that some
REGIONAL & FEDERAL STUDIES 13
business groups have been “slow to strengthen” their political presence in
Cardiff (Keating, Cairney, and Hepburn 2009, 7). Alternatively, it might
reflect the fact that, unlike Scotland and England, Wales is not a major
alcohol producer. As one advocate explained:
The alcohol industry is far [better] organized, and actually just far better
plugged into the lobbying networks [in Westminster]… [and so] there’s a
degree to which [industry] just weren’t looking at Cardiff.25
Another potential explanation is that the industry actors were strategically
focusing their efforts on legal challenges mounted elsewhere; first in Scotland
and later at European Union (EU) and UK levels (Hawkins and McCambridge
2020a). Although alcohol industry actors did participate in the consultations
led by the Welsh government, they were simply less vocal and prominent in
Wales compared to the Scottish and English cases (Holden and Hawkins 2013;
McCambridge, Hawkins, and Holden 2014).
It’s also worth noting which actors did not ultimately oppose MUP in
Wales. Despite early indications, the UK government never issued any legal
challenge to Wales’s legislative competence. This might be partly explained
by the UK government’s focus on other issues such as Brexit, and by the com-
plexity of the legal and political issues which saw the UK Government as
representing Scotland’s right to pass MUP as public health legislation in
the EU court case, whilst not proceeding with this particular policy for
England (Hawkins and McCambridge 2020a). According to one advocate:
[I think] one of the reasons the UK government didn’t get involved in the final
stages was because they [were] far too busy… getting us completely in or out
of the European Union.26
Discussion
Our analysis shows that alcohol policy innovation in Scotland was a necessary
but insufficient condition for alcohol policy change in Wales. Both countries
adopted very similar policies yet it would be a mistake to conceptualize the
Welsh decision as a case of copying or emulation. Our analysis documents a
process of policy-oriented learning, where policymakers made a concerted
effort over time to draw on an assortment of expertise and experiences
after the Scottish government’s policy sparked interest in Wales. For those
reasons, MUP in Wales is more consistent with what Evans terms hybridiz-
ation; the policy is not a carbon copy but shares many similarities to the orig-
inal. Public health actors operated as the key agents of hybridization in the
policy process, drawing on a wealth of policy-relevant knowledge, transna-
tional networks and familiarity with the Welsh political system.
Our analysis also suggests that broader developments in the UK, including
ambiguity over legislative competence as well as the Scottish legal challenge,
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influenced the policy process in Wales, including the time taken. Although
the Scottish model was a key consideration for Welsh decision-makers,
wider political developments in Scotland and the UK also influenced the
process. Since the principal legal question in the challenge to the Scottish
MUP law centred on whether the policy constituted a justifiable public
health protection measure, this made it much easier for the Welsh govern-
ment to maintain its preferred framing of the policy (i.e. as a public health
measure), which was the same as in Scotland (Katikireddi, Bond, and Hilton
2014). Making MUP a stand-alone bill was in part motivated by the impending
legal case in Scotland. The protracted nature of that dispute afforded greater
time for the public health community to assemble a stronger evidence base
in favour of the legislation and thus promote learning. Indeed the legal chal-
lenges by industry and consequent delay in implementation in Scotland
appear to have encouraged parallel processes in which public health argu-
ments and evidence were seen to be needed to be strengthened by the
policy community, both in Scotland (Hawkins and McCambridge 2020a)
and in Wales. These processes were also connected to some degree, as
some of the same actors e.g. the Sheffield researchers, were involved in
both. Questions of legislative competence and the potential challenge of
the UK government lingered as a major concern for the Welsh government.
Together, these consequences suggest that policymaking at the devolved
level should be studied with a multi-level governance lens. That being said,
alcohol pricing might be somewhat atypical in the influence of other govern-
ments and exogenous institutional processes on devolved policymaking. On
the other hand, the involvement of well-resourced transnational corporations
with capacity for venue shopping, and the very complexity of the policy pro-
cesses involved, may make alcohol policy analysis resonate with political
scientists focused on better understanding the interplay between levels of
governance in strongly contested and challenging areas of policy
development.
We also show how the specific design of governance structures in Wales
facilitated hybridization. Welsh policymakers had access to key experts and
stakeholder groups through various fora, including expert committees, con-
sultations and committee proceedings. Our analysis shows that over the
course of devolution, public health actors have strategically embedded them-
selves into policymaking structures in Wales. By contrast, industry actors have
focused on maintaining their relationship-building efforts and political activi-
ties at the UK-level. Relationships with legislators, familiarity with the Welsh
political system, and the government’s promotion of inclusivity and stake-
holder engagement meant that public health advocates were well-positioned
to promote their preferred problem-definition and policy alternatives (e.g.
the Scottish model). Incentives for policy transfer operate within institutional
contexts with clear sets of norms and ideas about how policy should be
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developed, and on what. Rather than lower policy capacity inhibiting inno-
vation, the experience of the UK devolved administrations on MUP and
alcohol has been that policymakers have been willing to take on challenging
policy issues that damage population health. A cursory comparison of the
Scottish and Welsh policies is unlikely to pick up on these nuances of the
policy process in Wales. Thus this study demonstrates the value of analysing
a single-case study over an extended period of time.
The influence of the public health policy community must also be appreci-
ated within the context of the Welsh government’s limited policy capacity.
We find that policymakers turned to the public health community precisely
because they lacked experience in formulating alcohol pricing policy.
Different parts of the policy community helped close key information gaps
for decision-makers, drawing attention to the local harms of alcohol use
(Alcohol Concern Cymru/Wales), the international evidence on pricing
(Alcohol Health Alliance, APoSM), and the estimated effects of different
pricing scenarios on health and social outcomes (Sheffield researchers). Our
analysis attests to the importance of policy communities, as has also been
recently demonstrated in the passage of alcohol public health legislation in
Ireland (Lesch and McCambridge 2021a, 2021b). This finding contributes to
a growing body of work suggesting that the policy tools of government,
and particularly subnational government, are not necessarily restricted to
fiscal capacity and/or legal authority in interesting ways (Connell, Martin,
and St Denny 2017, 2019). It is to be expected, however, that willingness to
draw on external participants’ ideas may vary across sectors and/or issues.
If governments possess more experience and organizational resources intern-
ally in a particular policy sphere they might be less inclined to turn to civil
society groups and experts.
Conclusion
Our findings shed light on interesting issues for the future study of policy
transfer, multi-level governance and alcohol policy. Although we know that
policy-oriented learning operates along a spectrum (from copying to inspi-
ration), we have a less clear understanding of the conditions that lead to
one mechanism over another. Our analysis suggests that learning is a func-
tion of policy capacity (broadly defined) as well as specific norms that
guide policy development and participation in the process. Future work
will be required to better understand the linkages between learning and
the configuration of institutions.
The study’s findings should also be considered within the broader litera-
ture on multi-level governance. Public support for devolution has been his-
torically less pronounced in Wales than in Scotland (Jones and Scully 2003).
More recent studies, however, suggest that the Welsh’s government
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legitimacy is increasing (Scully and Wyn Jones 2015). Heightening the visi-
bility of government actions through policy can strengthen the bonds
between citizens and the state (Mettler and Soss 2004). Adopting Welsh
approaches to public health could produce self-reinforcing feedback effects
of this nature; MUP has been a means by which the “Welsh Way” can be com-
municated. Research that incorporates attention to sub-state nationalism
(Béland and Lecours 2008) might be particularly instructive for exploring
future dynamics.
Finally, the findings also have implications for the study of alcohol policy.
Many evidence-based measures impose significant constraints on business
practices and are challenging to have adopted (McCambridge, Mialon, and
Hawkins 2018). Particularly in producer countries, including the UK, industry
actors are well organized politically. To date, alcohol policy researchers have
focused on the industry’s success in resisting evidence-based policies
through framing ideas and involvements in policy processes (Babor and
Robaina 2013; McCambridge, Mialon, and Hawkins 2018). This analysis
demonstrates the importance of studying broader institutional contexts
and focusing on the resulting policy outcomes (Lesch and McCambridge
2020), and identifying where industry actors are not well organized or
embedded in policy networks.
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